Policy Recommendation on the Competition Law Issues of the Re-use of Public Sector Information (PSI) by Maggiolino, Mariateresa
2012] M. Maggiolino: Policy Recommendation on Competition Law 373
POLICY RECOMMENDATION ON THE
COMPETITION LAW ISSUES OF THE RE-USE OF
PUBLIC SECTOR INFORMATION (PSI)
by
MARIATERESA MAGGIOLINO*
Based on a description of the structure and competitive relationships that character-
ize PSI markets, and in the light of some case studies and legal decisions from sev-
eral EU Member States, this document addresses what legal rules a new Directive,
amending Directive 2003/98/CE on the re-use of Public Sector Information, could
introduce in order to both discourage anticompetitive business practices and make
them easier to be detected and proved.
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1 PRELIMINARY REMARKS
Regulation and competition law are two of the main tools that public insti-
tutions may adopt in order to improve the functioning and development of
markets. Regulation sometimes aims to change the competitive structure of
specific sectors – identified as “strategic ones” – by setting the boundaries
and rules of the competitive game. In contrast, competition law declares un-
lawful certain business practices – i.e. agreements and unilateral conduct by
dominant firms – that occur under specific market conditions.
This  document  acknowledges  that  Directive  2003/98/CE  (hereinafter,
“the  Directive”)1 on the  re-use  of  Public  Sector  Information  (hereinafter,
“PSI”) – as well as the most recent proposal for a new directive amending it
(hereinafter, “the Proposal”)2 – are regulatory tools whereby the EU legisla-
* mariateresa.maggiolino@unibocconi.it; Università Bocconi.
1 See OJ L 345, 31.12.2003, p. 90. 
2 See  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive
2003/98/CE on re-use of public sector information, Brussels, 5 March 2012, 2011/0430 (COD). 
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ture aims to design PSI markets. However, this document will not be  dis-
cussing  all  the  policy  issues  that  arise  in  the  context  of  this  regulation,
which  are analyzed in  other  LAPSI’s  policy  recommendations.  Rather,  it
will be focusing solely on some matters concerning competition law. Based
on a description of the structure and competitive relationships that charac-
terize PSI markets,3 and in the light of some case studies and legal decisions
from several  EU Member States,  this  document shall  address what  legal
rules the Proposal could introduce in order to both discourage anticompeti-
tive business practices and make them easier to be detected and proved.
The Directive, indeed, already encompasses many recitals and provisions
that aim to ensure and protect competition, by addressing the relationship
between public sector bodies, operating in the upstream market for the pro-
vision of PSI, and private companies, competing in the downstream market
for the re-use of PSI.
2 PSI MARKETS AND PSI CASES
By and large, competition law analysis of business practices most frequently
starts with the definition of the relevant markets that are affected by such
practices and the understanding of the competitive dynamics that character-
ize those markets. As a result, these Policy Recommendations try to offer
some guidance for such an analysis in cases relating to PSI.
As to the definition of the relevant markets,4 two product markets need
to be distinguished regardless of whether public sector entities or private
sector firms may be competing on them: the market for the provision of that
information (the upstream market of PSI) and the market in which that in-
formation is  delivered to customers in the form of value-added goods or
services (the downstream market for value-added products).5
As to  the  competitive  dynamics  that  may characterize  these  markets,
granted that they differ  considerably according to the kind of PSI exam-
3 As it is well known, competition law and competition law analysis are heavily fact-specific.
See, in this regard, Forrester I., 2011, A Bush in Need of Pruning: the Luxuriant Growth of
“Light Judicial Review”, in Ehlermann C.D., Marquis M. (eds.),  European Competition Law
Annual 2009: Evaluation of Evidence and Its Judicial Review in Competition Cases, Hart Pub-
lishing, Oxford, p. 410 (stating in a very effective way, «just the facts ma’am: competition
cases are all about facts»). Since the Directive provides for one-fits-all-rules – i.e. rules that
must apply to many different kinds of PSI, such as meteorological, roadmap, marine, envir-
onment, financial, business, and property data – also these Recommendations refrain from
taking account of the many peculiarities of the different markets where the mentioned spe-
cies of PSI may be traded, so to offer a general analytical framework wherein more detailed
considerations could then be placed.
4 As to the definition of what a relevant product market is, and as to the criteria to be applied
see Commission notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community com-
petition law, OJ C 372, 9.12.1997, p. 5, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/.
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ined,6 it is worth noting that, on the one hand, public sector bodies do not
only  act  in  the  upstream market,  but  operate  in  downstream market  as
well.7 Indeed, in the last few years they have been able to envisage the busi-
ness opportunities arising from the re-use of PSI or, at least, to follow and
imitate private companies in exploiting the business opportunities that the
re-use of PSI entails. For instance, this is what is happening now in the Ital-
ian  market  for  information  goods  resulting  from  cadastral  data.  On the
other  hand, nowadays private sector firms are not operating only in  the
downstream market. They are also starting to produce information that is
equivalent, or even substitutable, to that held by public sector bodies.8 For
instance,  this  is  the case  of Google and Facebook,  that  generate content,
such as geographical and personal data, that in the past only public sector
bodies were able to provide. Another example is traffic and topographic in-
formation, where technology has allowed private sector firms to produce
information  that  may  substitute  information  generated  by  public  sector
bodies in pursuance of their public task.9 It  is  hard to predict  how these
markets will evolve in the future: firstly, more and more public sector bod-
5 For the sake of simplicity, the scenario depicted here does not distinguish those intermedi-
ate stages, such as the one of collecting PSI and combining it with different tangible and in-
tangible inputs, that in the real world may separate the initial phase of the mere production
of PSI from the final phase of its delivery to customers. This simplification is not meant to
conceal that, at such intermediate stages, value is effectively added to the original PSI and
that, at each of these stages, private firms may find themselves competing against a vertic-
ally-integrated public sector body. The point in keeping the market analysis as simple as
possible is that, given the whole chain of markets, the potentially anticompetitive character
of the practices regarding the intermediate markets is not different from the character of
most of the upstream and downstream markets.
6 See footnote 3 as to the need of keeping the here-developed discussion at a very general
level.
7 Although it  can  be  maintained  that  the  Directive  and  the  Proposal  want  to  encourage
private sector firms to fully develop PSI re-use, it is worth noting that none of them pre-
vents public sector bodies from acting in the downstream market as well, maybe in an in -
direct way, i.e. by delegating/assigning re-use activities to private companies that they con-
trol. Rather, they expressly envisage this case in Article 10(2) by observing that “if docu-
ments are re-used by a public sector body as input for its commercial activities which fall
outside the scope of its public task …”. Indeed, if one of the policy assumptions underlying
the Directive and the Proposal is that a growing re-use of PSI would lead to new informa-
tion  goods,  new  jobs  and  economic  growth,  it  is  therefore  consequential  to  deem  the
private/public nature of re-users as not being relevant per se. After all, not only private sec-
tor companies have a clear interest in exploiting the new business opportunities  coming
from the re-use of PSI; but public sector bodies as well may benefit from the further and
fresh  sources  of  income coming  from  PSI  re-use.  From  a  competition  law  perspective,
moreover,  a  market  in  which  public  sector  bodies  compete  with private  sector  firms is
totally acceptable, even when the former are vertically and collaterally integrated: competi-
tion law, indeed, is well-equipped to face potential anticompetitive conduct that public sec-
tor bodies might adopt to the detriment of not only their private competitors, but more im -
portantly of the general interest in having efficient and innovative markets.
8 The Directive and the Proposal do not take into account the case of private companies try -
ing to move into the upstream market. However, private sector firms might be interested in
generating information that substitutes PSI at least when: (a) public sector bodies are not
the sole entities, such as courts, that are authorized to generate a specific content, such as
court decisions; and (b) the generation of that content is economically feasible. Now, it is
precisely in this last regard that it can be argued that a “low price policy for PSI” could dis -
courage the private sector firms to either remain or enter into the upstream market. In the
former case, indeed, they would lose the money that they have already invested to produce
PSI; in the latter case, they would not have any incentive to start producing raw data that
can substitute PSI. For a further discussion of this last argument see LAPSI Guidelines and
Position Paper on the PSI Charging Principles. 
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ies could become more active in  downstream markets by offering value-
added services regarding their own PSI; secondly, more and more private
sector  firms  could enter  the  upstream market  by generating information
goods able  to  substitute  PSI.  From a theoretical  and general  standpoint,
however, the description of the relevant product markets regarding PSI, as
well  as the preliminary assessment  of the competitive dynamics  that  are
currently taking place in these markets, suggest that four alternative market
scenarios, with different competitive relationships, can be thought of:
Scenario no. 1
Scenario no. 2
9 Cases like that mentioned in the text highlight the general interest in enabling private com-
panies to move into the upstream market. In the long run, indeed, when private companies
show that they are able to substitute public sector entities in generating PSI-like informa-
tion, it might happen that there will no longer be any economic reasons to make some activ-
ities fall within the scope of public task and therefore to finance the fulfillment of that task
by taxes. In such a future scenario, it would still be up to the State to decide whether there
are still good political arguments for defining the public task as it used to be or whether
public funds should be reallocated toward other or new public tasks. For the traditional
economic idea that the generation of information is to be a task of the public sector, since in-
formation is a non-excludable and non-rival good (i.e. a public good in the economic sense)
see Stiglitz J.E. (2000), Economics of the Public Sector, W W Norton & Co., New York.
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Scenario no. 3
Scenario no. 4
In all these market scenarios, public sector bodies may engage in anticom-
petitive practices in the sense of competition law. However, it is not the pur-
pose of this document to classify such unlawful practices. Moreover, any at-
tempt to do so would have to be considered inappropriate given that mod-
ern competition policy advocates an effect-based approach,10 according to
which any assessment of a practice has to embrace a complete analysis of
the effects of that behaviour in the relevant market and, therefore, of the
facts characterizing the specific case.11
10 In other words, by and large, contemporary competition law links the illegal nature of the
conduct under scrutiny not to the presence of certain formal elements (such as some pecu-
liar contractual clauses) but to the economic effects that the practice is able to produce in the
identified relevant market.
11 Nevertheless, some examples of unlawful practices will be provided in the footnotes below,
which have arisen in the course of the first years of the implementation of the Directive in
the EU Member States.
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Nevertheless it is worth considering that, in the course of the first years
of the implementation of the Directive in the EU Member States, public sec-
tor bodies have been charged with and, sometimes, fined for having abused
their dominant position12 via: (i) unjustified refusal to license PSI13; (ii) ex-
cessive prices14; (iii) predatory prices financed via cross-subsidies15; and (iv)
anticompetitive discriminating practices in the form of price squeezes.16
3 PROPOSED CHANGES
The Directive and the Proposal already encompass many recitals and provi-
sions that, when implemented, can effectively and efficiently protect compe-
tition, by working in lieu of the more cumbersome competition law rules.
For instance,  the general  obligation for public  sector  bodies  to make PSI
available to re-users as provided for by Article 3 works as what competition
lawyers would have called a “compulsory license”. Likewise, the prohibi-
tion of unjustified refusals of PSI as set forth by Article 4 refers to the doc-
trine of objective justification as established for abuses of dominance.17 Fi-
nally, Articles 8, 10 and 11 of the Directive and the Proposal already estab-
lish many rules consistent with competition law principles dealing with ver-
tical agreements and vertical abuses of dominance; namely that: (i) licensing
conditions “shall not be used to restrict competition”; (ii) re-use has to be
granted  at  “fair,  proportionate  and  non-discriminatory  conditions”;  (iii)
public sector bodies that have started re-using their own PSI have to grant
12 For the notion of dominant position and for the criteria to be applied, see  Guidance on the
Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclu-
sionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ C 45, 24.02.2009, p. 7, paras 9-18.
13 See Agcm, A4 — Ancic/Cerved, provv. n. 452, 10 aprile 1992, in Boll. 7/1992. 
14 See App. Torino, 11 febbraio 2010, PNP Italia s.r.l. c. Agenzia del Territorio. 
15 See Cons. Conc. Avis no. 97 A-10, 25 Février 1997 relatif à une demande d'avis présentée par
le Groupement des editions de la presse nautique et portant sur des questions de concur-
rences soulevées par la politique éditoriale du service hydrographique de la marine, BOC-
CRF 18 Novembre 1997, p. 759; and Teresi L. (2005), ‘Données publiques et concurrence’,
Concurrences, Vol. 4, p. 147 and Bruguiere J. (2002), Les données publiques et le droit,  Edi-
tions Litec, Paris, pp. 140-145.
16 See Agcm, A129 — Denunce Infocamere-Cerved, provv. n. 5446, 6 novembre 1997, in Boll.
45/1997.  Furthermore,  see  what  was  discussed  in  United  Kingdom  Marine  Information
Council Working Group On Data Access (2003), Achieving optimal value from publicly funded
marine  information  resources,  p.  8,  available  at  http://epsiplatform.eu//sites/default/files/
ezpublish-media/UKMIC%20-%20achieving%20 optimal%20value.pdf; Y. Volman Y. (2004),
The re-use of public sector information in the EU. Increasing the scope for cross-border ex-
ploitation, in Van Loenen B., Kok B.C. (eds.), Spatial data infrastructure and policy development
in Europe and the United States, DUP Science, Delft, p. 62; and Weiss P.N. (2004), Borders in
Cyberspace: Conflicting Public Sector Information Policies and their Economic Impacts, in
Aichholzer G. & Burkert H. (eds.), Public Sector Information in the Digital Age. Between Mar-
kets, Public Management and Citizens' Rights, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Chelten-
ham, pp.145-149.
17 Typically, the protection of national security is included among the reasons that can justify
the refusal to license PSI. Furthermore, the protection of competition could be listed among
them, whenever the PSI in question consists of business data regarding prices and costs and
the market where these data are going to be disseminated is oligopolistic. In such a scen-
ario, indeed, the dissemination of that information could increase market transparency and,
in that way, firms’ ability to collude.
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the same opportunity to private companies as well; and (iv) exclusive agree-
ments must be forbidden, except those cases in which such agreements are a
necessary condition for providing a service of general economic interest.18
From a competition law perspective it can be asserted that some of these
provisions are too broad and, hence, an over-deterrence. In particular, com-
petition lawyers  would advise  both the general  obligation to license  PSI
(Article  3)  and the principle  of  non-discrimination concerning the condi-
tions of re-use (Article  10) only in cases where the public sector body in
question were effectively the sole supplier of the needed piece of informa-
tion (market scenarios 1 and 2, above). In contrast, where private undertak-
ings effectively competed as suppliers of similar information (market sce-
narios 3 and 4, above), competition lawyers would exclude distortions of
competition, resulting from unjustified refusals to license, and discrimina-
tory conditions, because private sector firms acting in downstream markets
would be able to receive information equivalent to PSI from private sector
companies. However, since the case of a competitive upstream market for
the supply of information goods equivalent to PSI is still quite theoretical,
we  do not recommend changing the texts of Articles 3 and 10, in order to
make them more consistent with competition rules. Indeed, we hereby rec-
ognize that, if articles 3 and 10 were re-written in order to cope with the dif-
ferent market scenarios that might arise, it would be difficult and expensive
to establish in which market scenario, firms are actually operating. Conse-
quently, the advantages in terms of simplicity and time, that the current Ar-
ticles 3 and 10 actually guarantee, would be nullified.
Differently, we hereby maintain that two other changes could be sug-
gested.
First, since the enforcement of competition law can be cumbersome and
expensive, and since it occurs  ex post, often once the harm to competition
has already occurred, or once the business opportunity springing from PSI
has already vanished, structural modifications should be made to the cur-
rent Directive in order to both reduce the incentives for public sector bodies
to undertake anticompetitive practices,  and make these practices easier to
be detected and proved. For instance, given that public sector bodies might
18 A different issue could be discussing whether exclusive licenses would also be necessary in
cases other than those where they serve as a means to provide a service of general economic
interest. See, in this regard, LAPSI Guidelines on PSI Licensing Agreements. Furthermore,
another issue might be that of understanding whether, in the cases where exclusive licenses
are necessary, auction systems would be the proper tool to select the licensees; and this
given the charging principles set forth by the old and the new Article 6 of the Directive and
the Proposal (see LAPSI Guidelines and Position Paper on the PSI Charging Principles).
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undertake  anticompetitive  pricing  strategies,  such  as  the  one  mentioned
above, we hereby suggest adopting a provision providing for “vertical dis-
integration”.  Namely,  in  order  to  prevent  cross-subsidization  and to  en-
hance cost transparency, the new Directive should oblige public sector bod-
ies  that want to commercialize  their  own PSI  in  downstream markets to
“vertically  disintegrate”  by  establishing  separate  entities  for  providing
value-added products and services.19 To be sure, the creation20 of separate
corporations whenever public sector bodies decide to re-use their PSI, first
of all, could prove to be costly (i.e. expensive and complex) and, hence, re-
duce the incentives of public sector bodies to re-use PSI themselves; and,
secondly, might prevent public sector bodies from using the income flowing
from the re-use of PSI to produce better and more PSI. Therefore, a less in-
trusive provision – that is however able to reduce the incentives for anti-
competitive pricing practices and guarantee cost  transparency – could be
that of obliging public sector bodies to keep “separate accounts” for the li-
censing  of  PSI,  on the  one hand,  and the  licensing  of  other  information
products and services, on the other hand.
Secondly, in order to make anticompetitive pricing strategies (such as
the ones listed above) easier to be detected and proved, the new Directive
should not condition the obligation to “indicate the calculation basis for the
published charge” as already provided for by Article 7 to the “request” of
re-users.  Public  sector bodies  should generally be under an obligation to
disclose all their costs.
19 In other words, the new Directive could reproduce a text similar to Article 8(2bis) of the
Italian Competition Act, about Public undertakings and statutory monopolies, which states
that public undertakings “shall operate through separate companies if they intend to trade
on markets other than those on which they trade” because they are entrusted, by law, with
the operation of services of general economic interest. 
20 To be sure, from a practical standpoint, this should not be deemed to be the same as those
unbundling cases that occurred in the energy sectors. Indeed, but for those few actual cases
where public sector bodies are already operating as PSI re-users in secondary markets via
their  same administrative  structure,  the  recommendation for  vertical  non-integration re-
quires the creation of brand new companies for brand new economic activities and not the
splitting up of a company that has been operating as a single entity in many markets.
